This study examines the informativeness and credibility of the reasons cited by independent directors for resignation. Given that directors are privy to private information about the firm, they may resign in anticipation of future underperformance in order to limit potential damage to their reputation. We posit that directors have an economic incentive not to disclose the true reason for their resignation in order to protect their existing equity ownership, business relationships, and future directorship opportunities. Consistent with these conjectures, we find that the likelihood of resignation increases with reputation and weak future performance. Moreover, cases where ambiguous or unverifiable resignation reasons are given, or no reason is provided, are associated with poor recent and future financial and operating performance. Investors and analysts appear to at least partially understand and respond to such misrepresentations, as evidenced by an immediate negative and economically significant market reaction and downward forecast revisions. Complementary factors such as positive concurrent operating results and richer information environment seem to alleviate investor concerns and mitigate the negative reaction.
I. Introduction
This study examines the informativeness and credibility of the reasons cited by independent directors for resignation. The importance of independent directors has increased in recent years, particularly from the perspective of regulators, as evidenced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requirement that audit committees be composed entirely of independent directors, as well as by the listing standards of U.S. exchanges which require boards to have a majority of independent directors. These requirements stem from the perceived advantages of appointing independent directors as monitors and advisers to management in that they are less beholden to the firm and/or the CEO, and add expertise and new perspectives to boards which might otherwise lack diversity.
1 Notwithstanding, there is growing evidence that independent directors-who are supposed to represent the interests of shareholders and maximize shareholder value-often act in ways that maximize their own utility at the expense of shareholders. For example, independent directors may support generous compensation packages to managers for personal reasons such as a desire to be reelected to the board or to enhance their business relationship with the firm (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006) . In addition, independent directors are likely to resign following poor firm performance, possibly to avoid the workload associated with restructuring the firm's operations (Yermack, 2004) , or in anticipation of poor forthcoming performance, at a critical time when advisers are most needed (Gupta and Fields, 2009; Asthana and Balsam, 2009; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010) .
We extend this line of research by examining the circumstances surrounding independent directors' departures and the informativeness and credibility of the reasons cited for resignation, particularly where it may be related to concerns about the future performance of the firm. Aside from the legal responsibility to disclose fully and fairly all material information, the motive for departure is important information for investors, and 1 The empirical evidence on the impact of independent directors on firm performance is mixed. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find a positive market reaction to the nomination of independent directors to the board. Core et al. (1999) document a positive association between the fraction of independent directors and the market-to-book-ratio. Nguyen and Nielsen (2009) find a negative market reaction to the sudden death of an independent director. In contrast, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) , Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , Klein (1998) , and Bhagat and Black (1997 Black ( , 2002 provide evidence that there is no positive association between firm value and independent directors. allows shareholders to react in a timely manner. We use the terms 'resignation' and 'departure' interchangeably to cover both resignation and refusal to stand for reelection, consistent with SEC filing guidelines.
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Directorships bring many benefits to the individual in terms of business connections, reputation and compensation (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Yermack, 2004; Perry 2000; Linn and Park, 2003) . A resignation signals that the 'cost' of serving on a board exceeds the benefits. The cost includes primarily the time commitment and the risk to the director's reputation, the latter being the most significant (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Directors who are privy to inside information about the firm may resign when they anticipate future underperformance in order to limit potential damage to their reputation (Gupta and Fields, 2009; Asthana and Balsam, 2009; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010) . While the evidence in the literature is consistent with greater likelihood of director resignation both following and in anticipation of weak operating and financial performance, it does not allow us to determine whether reputation concerns actually lead to the decision to resign when directors anticipate poor future performance.
Our first set of analyses show that the likelihood of departures increases unconditionally with reputation concerns and past negative profitability. In addition, our results indicate that director departures are motivated by the preservation of reputational capital in anticipation of poor firm performance. Moreover, those with a high reputation are more likely to resign in anticipation of weak future performance.
Regardless of reputation, departing directors have an incentive to disguise the true reason for their departure when this is due to concerns about future performance.
Attributing the departure to concerns about future performance (for example, by citing "disagreement") would have no apparent benefit for the departing director. First, conveying the true reason for the departure would likely trigger an immediate negative market reaction (Agrawal and Chen, 2009; Dewally and Peck, 2009) , which would adversely affect the financial position of the departing director, as well as that of management and the remaining directors. Second, it would likely increase public scrutiny of both the board and management, and may open the door to shareholder intervention and even litigation -consequences which could undermine the departing director's relationship with management and the remaining directors. Indeed dissenting directors experience a decline in the number of board appointments they are offered in the future (Marshall, 2010) . Hence, they may disguise the true motive for resignation by citing benign or ambiguous motives such as 'time constraints' and 'personal reasons', or by not providing an explanation.
To facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the resignation announcements and their informativeness, we use data from Audit Analytics to identify all resignation cases from 2004 through 2012. We group the reasons for departure into four mutually exclusive categories. The first category, henceforth referred to as 'Disagreement', includes all resignations where the outside director or the company specifically cites a disagreement with management on a matter relating to the company's operations, policies or practices.
It thus includes cases where the resignation provides a strong signal that the director has concerns about the future performance of the firm. 3 It also covers a handful of cases (five in our sample period) of 'Investigations', where the reason cited for departure is the launch or existence of a formal investigation of the director (for example by the SEC, and normally unrelated to the directorship). 4 The second category, accounting for over 60% It is conceivable that some resignations with disagreement cannot be entirely attributed to concerns about future performance, but may be rather related to personal differences with the CEO or to past and present events. Nevertheless, this category is the most likely to explicitly include resignation cases due to such concerns. 4 We combine these five cases into one category with disagreements for ease of presentation, due to their small number and because they are similarly verifiable and likely negative reasons. However, investigations are first and foremost indicative of potential wrongdoing by the director, not the firm, and thus we also conduct the analysis excluding these five cases (untabulated). Results remain the same. 5 Arguably there is not much difference between Outside Commitments and Personal. We opt to treat them separately because of the large portion of cases where the director specifically indicates 'outside commitment' as the reason for the departure.
Outside Commitments. Furthermore, returns in the year prior to as well as following the latter departure categories are negative and economically significant as well. A similar picture emerges when we examine past and future operating performance surrounding these ambiguous departures, indicating weak operating performance preceding as well as following these seemingly benign departure categories.
We further investigate the issue of seemingly benign motives by partitioning the reasons cited for departures into two groups based on the perceived reliability and verifiability of the reason cited (Mercer, 2004; Hutton, Miller and Skinner, 2003 We find that resignations where ambiguous or unverifiable reasons are cited, or no reason is provided, are preceded as well as followed by poor financial and operating performance (equity returns, profitability and cash flows in the year preceding and following the resignation date), casting serious doubt on the true motivation for departure and the reliability of the explanation given. Furthermore, investors do not appear to be convinced by such seemingly benign explanations. We document negative abnormal returns around these resignation announcements that are both statistically and economically significant, suggesting that resignations by independent directors send a negative signal to capital markets about future firm performance. In contrast, past and future financial and operating performance are not different from zero when the director provides a verifiable and neutral reason for departure.
As an added measure, we investigate whether and to what extent financial analysts -presumably adept at information gathering and interpretation -are better able to see through the justification provided and translate the implications of the departure into tangible forecasts. We find negative analyst forecast revisions following ambiguous and unverifiable director departures. These findings provide additional support for our conjecture that some directors who resign voluntarily do not cite the true reason for their departure when it is related to concerns about future performance.
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The picture that emerges from our analyses implies a potential breach of fiduciary duty by some independent directors, with possible collusion or tacit agreement on the part of firms. Indeed, the perceived advantages of appointing outside "independent" directors as monitors and advisers to management seem to take a back seat to personal incentives, reputational capital and self-preservation on the part of some independent directors. This extends beyond the mere omission or concealment of a director's concerns about the business; at best their governance role in monitoring and advising management will be feeble and 'off the record'. These findings help to explain the conflicting evidence in prior research regarding the benefits of director independence.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, to our knowledge it is the first to examine the reasons cited for resignations by independent directors. Second, we present evidence that directors are likely to disguise the true reason for resignation whenever it is related to concerns about future performance. This central finding provides additional support to our conjecture that independent directors often take actions that maximize their own utility at the direct expense of shareholders, especially in the absence of other monitoring mechanisms. Third, we show that investors and analysts at least partially understand and respond to these potential misrepresentations.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant prior literature and develops the hypotheses, section 3 describes the data, section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses

Director Resignations, Performance, and Reputation
When deciding whether to resign, directors trade off the benefits provided by the directorship position against the cost of continuing to serve on the board. 7 Directorships provide several important benefits: business relationships, learning business practices from high-quality managers, the opportunity to contribute to society (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989) and acquiring reputation as an expert in decision control and monitoring, which in turn may help to secure additional board appointments (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and compensation. The importance of compensation has increased in the past decade as a growing number of directors are compensated by equity-related instruments such as stock options and restricted stock, in addition to cash retainers, meeting fees, committee fees, insurance and other fringe benefits.
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While directorships provide substantial benefits, they also entail direct costs in terms of time commitment and effort, and indirect costs, primarily reputation risk.
Directors have a strong incentive to maintain a good reputation as business monitors since this may help them secure additional board seats with accompanying compensation (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Research suggests that a director's reputation is directly affected by the performance of the firm. Individuals hold fewer directorships after serving in companies that experience financial distress (Gilson, 1990) , that are acquired (Hartford, 2003) , that perform poorly (Yermack, 2004) , that experience financial statement restatement, especially if the director is a member of the audit 7 Our analysis focuses exclusively on the resignation of independent directors. Inside directors are excluded because of the different incentives related to the resignation decision and the reasons cited for departure. Because they are employed by the firm and are typically part of senior management, inside directors have less incentive to resign as they receive most of their compensation and prestige from the company. Moreover, the legal risks are considerably higher for inside directors in their capacity as senior executives. In contrast, independent directors are typically employed by other firms and hold other directorships, hence the personal economic impact of resignation is smaller. 8 Yermack (2004) estimates that the average annual value of cash retainer and equity-related compensation of directors of Fortune 500 companies is around $70,000. Perry (2000) and Linn and Park (2003) calculate that the value of the additional array of compensation in the form of meeting fees, committee fees, insurance, and other fringe benefits increases the annual compensation by one third. This implies that the average annual total compensation for Yermack's sample is around $90,000. In a more recent survey, Meyer and Partners (2002) estimate that director compensation, not including the value of fringe benefits and other fees, amounts to $152,000 in the largest 200 companies and $116,000 in the largest 1,000 companies.
committee (Srinivasan, 2005) , and that are sued for financial fraud (Fich and Shivdasani, 2007 However, neither the company nor the director has any incentive to disclose the disagreement because it implies direct and indirect costs for the company and the director, and no apparent benefit. 11 The firm has no reason to disclose disagreement because this would trigger an economically significant negative market reaction which would translate into a direct monetary loss for the departing director, management, and remaining directors through their equity ownership, in addition to shareholder dissatisfaction. Furthermore, resignation citing disagreement is likely to attract public scrutiny of the company, given the perception that directors may have access to information not available to the public at large. Public scrutiny may be costly for management and the remaining directors for several reasons. First, they will have to explain the disagreement and defend the position that led to the resignation. Second, the additional scrutiny may uncover other problems within the company. Third, it may have a negative impact on the reputation of management and the board if it is found that the resignation with disagreement had merit. These costs likely deter companies from voluntarily disclosing that a resignation is related to disagreement. Similarly, departing directors have no incentive to cite disagreement because the above-mentioned costs are likely to undermine their relationship with the company and adversely affect their business dealings, as well as jeopardize their future directorship appointments (Marshall, 2010) . 12 Hence, if a departure is indeed prompted by concerns about future performance, 11 Firms have to disclose the reasons for the departure as provided by the director. If the director does not give a reason for the resignation then the firm's only obligation is to report the resignation. The exception is resignation with disagreement. Companies where the director resigns because of a disagreement have to explain the circumstances that led to the resignation and disclose any correspondence from the director related to the resignation. 12 Arguably, a resignation with disagreement may establish the reputation of the director as a more vigilant monitor, as well as distancing the director from a poorly performing firm. However, this may be achieved at the expense of future board appointments (for example, where CEOs prefer less vigilant directors who will approve, excessive CEO compensation. See Bebchuk and Fried (2006) Further, shareholders have a right to be able to rely upon the truthfulness of all information disseminated to them by the directors (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP 1999) . However, what constitutes disagreement is poorly defined, and given the incentives of both the director and company to hide any disagreement, as well as the myriad reasons available to explain the resignation, it would be hard to prove that the director actually resigned because of disagreement when a more opaque explanation is given. Moreover, independent directors generally face limited legal liability since legal procedures are often costly and ineffective, and various mechanisms can be used to avoid legal penalties (see Fairfax, 2005 and Black et al. , 2005) for a comprehensive review of the legal risks faced by independent directors).
We examine the information content of the departure disclosure by analyzing the association between the reason for the resignation and the reaction of investors and analysts to the announcement. We also examine the relation between subsequent firm performance and the reasons for the departure. We posit that the reaction by investors and analysts to the reported reason for resignation predictably depends on the extent to which the reported reason is verifiable or reliable (Mercer, 2004; Hutton, Miller and Skinner, 2003) . Disagreement and Investigation are two clear cases where the reason itself conveys negative news, and moreover is unlikely to be misrepresented, so there is no poor performance of the CEO, approve other perquisites and engage in other non-shareholder valuemaximizing activities (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). tension in these cases and the expectation in both cases is that the market will respond negatively to these reported reasons (dubbed 'Verifiable-Negative'). To the extent that a non-verifiable resignation provides a signal that the director potentially has concerns about the future performance of the firm, the reaction by investors to the resignation announcement is likely to be related to current operating performance and the information environment of the firm. Non-verifiable resignations following poor operating performance are more likely to be perceived as untruthful and send a stronger signal of weak future performance than resignations following strong operating performance. Similarly, the reaction also depends on the information environment. Since the source of investor concern about the true reason for director departure is lack of information about the true health and prospects of the firm, we expect the information environment of the firm to be a moderating factor in the reaction of investors to resignation announcements. Hence, our hypothesis:
H3:
The investor reaction to non-verifiable resignations will depend on current operating performance and the information environment of the firm.
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We obtain data on resignations of independent directors from Director and Officer 18 The new rule significantly increased the number of events to be reported in 8-K filings, and shortened the time period required to disclose these events to no more than 4 business days after the occurrence of the event. See Lerman and Livnat (2010) for a more detailed description of the changes to Form 8-K, and their impact on the value relevance of these filings and on financial statements in general. One of the changes to the 8-K relates to departure or election of directors and departure or appointment of principal officers, which are reported in Section 5.02 of the form. The change to the Section requires firms to report immediately resignation by directors and to disclose the reasons for the departure as provided by the departing director. If the company is aware that the resignation involves disagreement on any matter relating to the company's operations, policies or practices, then the company has to explain the nature of the disagreement. Prior to the change, departure of directors was reported under Item 6. Former Item 6 required disclosure of departure of directors only if all the following conditions applied: the director resigned as a result of disagreement, provided a letter of resignation describing the disagreement, and requested the company to publicly disclose the matter. Thus, the incidence of director departures reported under former Item 6 was limited to departures due to disagreement where the director specifically asked to disclose the nature of the disagreement. Given the limited scope of departures reported under former Item 6 and the discretion afforded to directors with respect to the disclosure related to the resignation, one could not examine the market reaction to resignation announcements that did not involve disagreement. The new rule also allows an analysis of the information content of the reasons for the departure as provided by the director.
effective date of departure to be no more than four days, as the new SEC disclosure rule requires firms to disclose resignation by officers of the firm not more than four working days after the event. 19 We also exclude departures related to M&A, spinoffs, bankruptcy and restructuring because the reaction to these departures could be attributed to the event itself. These restrictions result in a sample of 5,647 filings by 2,916 firms from 2004 to 2012. Table 1 year following the resignation are also significantly negative, with mean and median of -6.26% and -1.65%, respectively. The negative returns in the year after the resignation support our conjecture that independent directors may resign not only after but also in anticipation of poor future firm performance. The operating performance of the sample firms is consistent with the negative market returns; the mean industry-adjusted ROA and operating cash flows in the most recent fiscal year ending before (after) the resignation date are significantly negative at -6.55% (-5.85%) and -0.87% (-1.39%), respectively.
The average age of the departing director is around 60, and average tenure on the board is approximately nine years. The departing director holds on average 0.6 additional board seats (as an independent director). Close to 20% of the departing directors serve on the audit committee and 17% on the nomination or compensation committee. About 22% of the departure cases involve more than one independent director. In 9% (35%) of the departure filings the company announced the appointment of a new executive (new independent director).
Board characteristics indicate that the average board size is nine members, including insiders. The CEO is the chairman of the board in approximately 46% of the cases. Less than 3% of the boards are categorized as busy, where busyness is defined following Fich and Shivdasani (2006) . 20 The average firm age, measured as the number of years since the IPO, is 19 years, with mean total assets of 4,331 million dollars.
IV. Results
Likelihood of Departure
Before testing the hypothesis that the reasons for the departure provided by director are suspect-primarily in cases where directors potentially resign in order to protect their reputation capital-we first examine whether reputable directors are more likely to resign when they foresee poor operating performance, consistent with an attempt to maintain their reputation capital. We estimate the following model: The model is estimated at the director-firm-year level conditional on resignation by at least one independent director. Specifically, the observations include all the independent directors of firm-years where at least one of the independent directors resigned in that particular year. The dependent variable is Departure Dummy which takes the value of 1 if director i of firm y resigned in year t and zero otherwise. The independent variables include proxies for reputation, negative future performance and negative past performance indicators, interaction variable of reputation with both future and past negative performance indicators, and controls. We test whether directors with a high reputation are more likely to resign when they foresee negative future performance based on the sign of a5. Specifically, a positive and significant coefficient indicates that directors with a high reputation are more likely to resign when they anticipate negative future performance. Similarly, we test whether reputation is related to the decision to resign following weak performance based on the sign of a4. Following H1b we expect the coefficient will not be different from zero.
We measure director reputation using the log of number of outside board positions held by the director in one specification and an indicator with 1 if the director holds more than one directorship in a second specification. Using the number of board seats as a proxy for reputation capital is consistent with the extant literature on director reputation (e.g., Gilson, 1990; Ferris et al., 2003; Yermack, 2004) ; directors who hold more than one directorship are considered to have higher reputation capital. We cannot observe directors' expectations for future performance. However, since directors are privy to private information, it is reasonable to assume that they are able, at minimum, to foresee whether the firm is likely to show positive or negative profitability in the coming period. Hence, Negative_Performance t+1 is an indicator equal to 1 if ROA in year t+1 is negative and zero otherwise. We define Negative_Performance t indicator based on the sign of ROA in year t.
The control variables include other factors that are likely to be associated with the likelihood of departure such as the tenure of the director and an indicator for age greater than 69, since for many companies the mandatory retirement age is 70. We do not include additional firm-level controls such as board size and market value of equity. This is because the regressions are estimated at the director-firm-year level and hence adding firm-level controls induces a high correlation across observations. Furthermore, firm and year fixed effects are likely to capture yearly firm-level effects such as size. We cluster the standard errors at firm level to account for possible serial correlations.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] Table 2 , Column 1 (Column 2) shows the results where reputation is measured as an indicator (continuous) variable based on the number independent directorships. In both specifications we observe that the likelihood of departure by independent directors is positively associated with reputation, indicating that reputable directors are more likely to resign unconditionally-perhaps because they have other board alternatives and consequently a lower relative cost of departure compared with directors who hold only one directorship position. Although not statistically significant, the positive coefficient on negative future performance suggests that the likelihood of departure is consistent with our conjecture that directors are more likely to resign when they foresee weak future operating performance. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction variable of reputation and negative future operating performance indicator is positive and significant at 10% or better in both specifications, indicating that the likelihood of departure given negative future operating performance increases with reputation. This result provides support to the hypothesis (H1b) that reputable directors are more likely to resign when they foresee weak operating performance in order to protect their reputation capital.
Consistent with the findings in Yermack (2004), we find that the likelihood of departure increases with past negative profitability (p-value<0.01). However, the interaction of past negative profitability and reputation is negative and not significant, supporting the second part of the hypothesis (H1a). These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the effect of past financial performance on reputation is essentially a sunk cost because directors have already incurred the damage to their reputation. Although there is no benchmark against which to test the number of resignations with disagreement, it appears to be very low compared with the frequency of the other categories. Put differently, if directors and firms are fully compliant and forthcoming with respect to disclosing the reasons for departure, this statistic suggests that 98.4% of director resignations take place when the director agrees with management on all matters 21 Another interpretation of the results is that since outside board membership is indicative of more experience or skill (see, e.g. Rubin and Segal, 2013) , departure by multi-board directors can cause poor operating performance in subsequent periods. While plausible, the results indicate that director departures are also preceded by negative performance. This suggests that having skilled and experienced directors on the board does not prevent poor operating performance. Hence, the reverse causality argument cannot fully explain our results. 22 Agrawal and Chen (2009) We further investigate the issue of seemingly benign resignation reasons by partitioning the reasons for departure into two groups based on how reliable and verifiable the reason signal is, compared with the alternative base notion that it is 23 Item 5.02 requires knowledge by management of such disagreement on the part of the departing directors. Thus, to avoid stating disagreement as the cause of departure (when indeed disagreement exists), the resigning director must either conceal their disagreement altogether, or refrain from making their disagreement formally registered allowing management to avoid its acknowledgement. Either scenario, suggests breach of fiduciary duty and role as board members (see discussion in Section II).
prompted by personal incentives related to effort aversion or preservation of reputational capital in anticipation of poor performance (Mercer, 2004; Hutton, Miller and Skinner, 2003 Additional tests with respect to future abnormal returns indicate that this trust may not be merited. The coefficients on the control variables indicate that returns are more negative when more than one director resigns. The negative market reaction is mitigated when the company announces the appointment of a new independent director in the same filing, or when the director's tenure is long.
Column (2) of Table 4 replicates the regression in Column (1) Our next set of analyses further investigates the association between departure reasons and short-window announcement returns while examining the effects of concurrent operating performance and the information environment on this association.
Because investors likely respond negatively to unverifiable departure reasons for fear that they signal poor future performance, we hypothesize that departures announced during 'good times' are less likely to entail a negative market reaction even when the stated reason is less credible. Put differently, given that performance is correlated at least in the short term, resignation following a negative operating performance is more likely to signal future negative operating performance than a resignation following positive performance. Furthermore, we expect the reaction to the resignation categories to depend on the information environment of the firm. Since the source of investor concern about the true reason for director departure is lack of information about the true prospects of the firm, we expect the information environment of the firm to be a moderating factor in the reaction of investors to resignation announcements.
We examine empirically the moderating impact of the concurrent operating performance and information environment by including interaction variables of the resignation categories with concurrent profitability and analysts following respectively.
To the extent that these factors indeed moderate investors' reaction, the coefficient on the interaction variables are expected to be positive.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] Table 5 presents the regression results. Column 1 shows the results where we include interaction terms of the resignation categories and profitability (log(1+ROA)). As reported in Table 4 , with the exception of Personal Reasons, the coefficient on the resignation categories is negative and significant. More importantly, with the same exception for Personal Reasons, the coefficient on the interaction variables of the resignation categories with profitability are all positive and significant, indicating that current operating performance positively affects the market reaction to director departures. Similarly, the interaction of information environment proxy-the number of analysts following-with the departure categories is positive for all categories, though significant only for the No Reason and Personal Reasons categories, indicating that a better information environment reduces the uncertainty associated with the signal related to the resignation and therefore mitigates a negative investor reaction.
Analysts Reaction to Directors' Departure
The results thus far indicate that investors react negatively to departures and the reaction is more negative if the reason provided by the director is non-verifiable. They also suggest that the reaction is affected by current operating performance and the information environment of the firm. In this sub-section, we examine analysts' reaction to director resignations and the reason provided. Given that financial analysts are adept at information gathering and interpretation, they understand the incentive for departing directors not to reveal concerns about future performance and can potentially see through the opaque justifications given for departure. Moreover, analysts are better equipped to assemble the pieces in the mosaic of firm-related information and translate their implications into tangible forecasts. Therefore we explore the occurrence and direction of analyst forecast revisions following director departures and their association with departure reasons.
One obstacle is the evidence in Rubin et al. (2013) which suggests analysts tend not to react to non-financial information such as director resignations. In particular, they find that, on average, analysts react to only 38% of all non-financial events reported on form 8-K. Their results are puzzling because the low reaction relates to non-financial events that trigger a significant market reaction. Nevertheless, the authors provide evidence that analysts who react to non-financial information are more skillful. We therefore focus on the group of analysts that react to resignation announcements.
Since analysis is conditional on the reaction, and resignation by directors represents negative news, we expect a priori that the reaction is on average negative.
However, if analysts take the reasons for resignation at face value then we expect variation in the likelihood of reaction across categories and in the sign of the reaction. In particular, there should be lower likelihood and less negative reaction to all categories in comparison to the Disagreement category. Finding a similar frequency of reaction across categories as well as analysts revising forecasts downwards regardless of the reason for departure would provide further evidence that market participants do not take the reason cited at face value.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] Table 6 , Panel A provides descriptive statistics. Since Audit Analytics, the main source of the departures sample, includes smaller firms, not all firms in our sample are covered by IBES. To be included in the sample we require at least one forecast of current fiscal year earnings prior to the departure filing. Out of the 5,647 filings in our sample, 3,987 resignations are by directors of firms covered by IBES. Of the 3,987 resignations, we identify 1,054 resignations that triggered a current fiscal year forecast revision by at least one analyst. We define 'reaction' to resignation if the forecast revision occurs between the event date and 6 days after the filing date. 25 We find that analysts react to approximately 26% of the resignation cases. Our findings are consistent with those of Rubin et al. (2013) and suggest that for most resignation cases there is no analyst reaction. Looking across the resignation categories, we observe that the reaction to the benign categories is similar to the sample average, yet the reaction to resignations citing disagreement is only approximately 16%. To the extent that analysts' reaction to disagreements represents a benchmark for reaction to resignations with a clear negative signal by the director regarding future performance, the stronger reaction to supposedly benign resignations indicates that analysts do not take the reasons cited at face value.
Column 4 shows that the average number of analysts following the firm is around 9 and is similar across the resignation categories. Column 5 shows the total number of revisions for each category, and Column 6 provides the proportion of analysts who reacted to the news. For example, there were 54 resignation cases with disagreement in firms covered by IBES. Of the 54 cases, 9 cases (17%) elicit forecast revision by at least one analyst. Interestingly, the proportion of resignations that resulted in forecast revisions for the entire sample is much higher at 26% (1,054 revisions out of 3,987 resignations), as are the proportions for each of the other reason categories, ranging from 26% to 29%.
The number or proportion of analysts who reacted is another useful indicator. The average number of analysts following the firms where disagreement was cited is 7.89, so the maximum number of potential revisions in reaction to these 9 cases is 71. However, the total number of revisions amounted to 27, indicating that only 38% of the analysts covering firms that reported resignation citing disagreement reacted. 
V. Conclusions
In this investigation of the information content of the reasons cited by independent directors for resignation, our main hypothesis is that directors have an incentive to disguise the true reason for the resignation in so far as it is related to concerns about future performance of the firm. Citing disagreement with management on any issue related to the operation or policies of the firm come at a significant cost to the director and the firm, due to the potentially adverse effect on the director's equity holding, business relations, and future directorship opportunities.
We show that directors with a high reputation are more likely to resign in anticipation of weak future performance. Consistent with previous research, we find that the departure of independent directors elicits an immediate negative market reaction and is associated with poor financial and operating performance in the year before as well as The table reports results of an estimation of the likelihood of director departure given a measure of their reputation and past and future firm performance. The regressions are based on Boardex universe. We include in the sample all independent directors of firm-years where at least one of the independent directors resigned during the year. The dependent variable is an indicator with 1 if an independent director left the board and zero otherwise. 'D(Independent directorship>=1)' is a dummy equal to one if number of independent directorships is more than one. 'Log number of independent directorship' is log of one plus number of independent directorship at other firms. 'D(Neg ROA,t)' is a dummy equal to one if ROA is negative in the most recent financial statement prior to departure. 'D(Neg ROA,t+1) is a dummy equal to one if ROA is negative in the year immediately after the director departure filing. 'D(Age>69)' is a dummy equal to one if the age of departing director is more than 69 years old. All the other variables are defined under Table 1 . Constants are included but not displayed. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at firm level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denotes significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level.
(1) The table reports regression results of returns around the resignation date (Column 1) and in the year following the resignation (Column 2) on the resignation categories and other controls. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at firm level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denotes significance level at 10%,5% and 1% level.
(1) 
